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RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME
AND CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE SYNDROME
Paul C. Giannelli
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard IN. Weatherhead
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University

!n recent years, prosecutors have attempted to
introduce expert testimony concerning rape trauma
syndrome in rape prosecutions. Similarly, they have
offered evidence of child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome in child abuse cases. The use of both
syndromes has been controversial. This article discusses
the legal and scientific bases for this use of social
science research.

RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME
The phrase rape trauma syndrome (RTS) was coined
by Burgess and Holmstrom to describe the behavioral,
somatic, and psychological reactions of rape and
attempted rape victims. Burgess & Holmstrom, "Rape
Trauma Syndrome," 131 Am. J. Psychiatry 981 (1974). See
~~· also Burgess, "Rape Trauma Syndrome," 1 Behav. Sci.
~~ & Law 97 (Summer 1983). Based on interviews with 146
"' women, they found that victims usually progress through

a two-phase process - an acute phase and a long-term
reorganization phase. Impact reactions in the acute
phase involve either an "expressed style" in which fear,
anger and anxiety are manifested, or a "controlled style"
in which these feelings are masked by a composed or
subdued behavior. Somatic reactions include physical
trauma, skeletal muscle tension, gastrointestinal irritability, and genitourinary disturbance. In addition, a wide
gamut of emotional reactions, ranging from fear, humiliation, and embarrassment to anger, revenge, and selfblame are exhibited.
The second phase, the reorganization phase, typically
begins two to six weeks after the attack and is a period in
which the victim attempts to re-establish her life. This
period is characterized by activity, such as changing
residences, changing telephone numbers, or visiting
family members. Nightmares and dreams are common.
Rape-related phobias, such as fear of being alone or fear
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It is with mixed emotions, a touch of sadness and a tinge of
relief, that I write this last chapter of my tenure as Cuyahoga
County Public Defender. But, alas, it seems as if it is time to
do so.
On May 19, 1977, I was tmnsformed from the role of 26
years as a prosectutor and selected to be the first Chief Public
Defender of Cuyahoga County. (A true metamorphosis!).
Since that date with one employee (myself) and 6000 square
feet in the newly constructed Justice Center, we grew to 83
employees and 16,000 square feet in a beautifully renovated
West Third, 100 Lakeside Place. Our offices are comprised of
Felony, Juvenile, and Appellate Divisions with supporting
staff of social workers, investigators, secretaries, and law
clerks which handle approximately 10,000 cases per year.
The development of the Public Defender Office would not
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Public Defender Commissioners, Judges, County Administrators, Office of Budget Management, State Public
Defenders, Professor Paul Gianelli and the Defender
Reporter, The Legal Aid Society, and many others.
I'll be retiring by August 1993, and my greatest thanks
goes to my staff, past and present, for making this office
what it is today. The greatest pride I have is watching young
lawyers develop into accomplished litigators.
So thanks to all of you for what we all have accomplished.
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women who have not l::leen victimized. Research on
PTSD among rape victims is more recent but consistently suggests that many victims experience PTSD
symptoms following an assault. Initially high symptom
levels generally abate by 3 to 4 months postassault,
although significant levels of distress continue for
many victims. /d. at 301.
The focus of much of the research was to understand
the victim's reactions in order to provide assistance to the
victim. The focus was not to evaluate a victim's reactions
in order to establish the fact that a rape had occurred,
which is how RTS evidence is sometimes used at trial.
There is an accepted body of research concerning the
aftereffects of rape. The critical issue, however, is how
the research is used in court.
Frazier and Borgida also reviewed expert testimony in
the reported cases. In several instances they found
·testimony that was unsupported by research. For example,
in Lessard v. State, 719 P.2d 227, 233 {Wyo. 1986), the
expert testified that it is "very common" for a victim to
ask an assailant not to tell anyone about the assault.
Frazier and Borgida concluded that "this particular
behavior has not been documented in the research
literature." Frazier & Borgida, supra at 304. Their conclusions concerning court testimony are noteworthy:
In sum, experts in recent cases have described a
broad range of symptoms and behaviors as consistent
with RTS, some of which do not appear to be based on
research. Testimony that is not research based often
seems to be prompted by a defendant's claims that a
complainant's behavior was inconsistent with having
been raped. If virtually any victim behavior is
described as consistent with RTS, the term soon will
have little meaning. Indeed, some critics have argued
that this already is the case ... /d. at 304-05.

of having people behind one, and difficulties in sexual
·
relationships also are prominent.
Other studies elaborated on the initial research, sometimes confirming the earlier studies and sometimes
providing additional insights. "Subsequent research,
which is much more rigorous, conceptualizes rape
trauma in terms of specific symptoms rather than more
general stages of recovery." Frazier & Borg ida, "Rape
Trauma Syndrome: A Review of Case Law and Psychological Research," 16 Law & Hum. Behav. 293, 299 (1992).
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder·
RTS is now recognized as a type of post-traumatic
stress disorder {PTSD), and such disorders are included
in the most recent edition of the American Psychiatric
Association's diagnostic manual. A.P.A. Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual ofMental Disorder 247 {3d ed. rev.
1987) ("Post-traumatic Stress Disorder"). This approach
to RTS, however, does not focus on the two-stage model
of recov~ry posited by Burgess and Holmstrom but rather
on specific symptoms.
Criticism
Critic:s have questioned the scientific basis for RTS
evidence. After surveying the literature {1984), one
commentator concluded that "definitional problems,
biased research samples, and the inherent complexity of
the phenomenon vitiate all attempts to establish empirically the causal relationship implicit in the concept of a
rape trauma syndrome." Note, "Checking the Allure of
Increased Conviction Rates: The Admissibility of Expert
Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal
Proceedings;'L70Va .. l::Rev. 1657, 1678(1984). Some of
the research problems included (1) unrepresentative
samples, {2) the failure to distinguishbetween victims of
rapes, attempted rapes, and molestation, and {3) the
failure to account for individual idiosyncratic and
incident-specific reactions. /d. at 1678-80. In 1989 a
psychologist concluded that "research on the rape trauma
syndrome is not probative on prior consent, prior trauma,
nor the cause of the complainant's current behavior."
Graham, "Rape Trauma Syndrome: Is It Probative of
Lack of Consent?," 13 Law & Psych. Rev. 25, 41-42 (1989).
A 1992 review of ttie literature by Frazier and Borg ida
included a number of findings: Although victims
experience arCiiJQe ofsymptonis, only a few symptoms
have. been studied consistently- fee1r and anxiety,
depression~ soc.iai maladjustmemt, and sexual dysfunction. Recent studies also document symptoms identified
for PTSD-'- recurrent nightmares, irritability, and hypervigilance. Frazier & Borgida, "Rape Trauma Syndrome: A
Review of the Case Law and Psychological Research,"
16 Law & Hum. Behav. 293, 300 {1992). They concluded:
In our opinion, although early studies were plagued
by numerous methodological problems ... , several
studies have since been conducted that are much
more sophisticated methodologically ... These
studies have assessed victim recovery at several
points after the assault using standardized assessment measures and have employed carefully matched
control groups. This research has established that
rape victims experience more depression, anxiety,
fear, and social adjustment and sexual problems than

JURY STUDIES
Social scientists have also attempted to determine
whether the typical jury is generally knowledgeable
about the aftereffects of rape, and what the impact of
expert testimony on this subject will have on a jury. ·1n
1988 Frazier and Borgida administered an 18-item questionnaire on sexual assault to two professional groups:
rape experts and PTSD,experts. Frazier & Borgida, "Juror
Common Understanding and the Admissibility of Rape
Trauma $yndrqme Evidence in Court;'' 12 Law & Hum.
Behav. 101 {1988). The responses of the experts were
then compared to those of two nonexpert groups
{students and nonacademic university staff).
Significantly, the non experts were unaware of the
behavioral changes a victim often experiences following
a rape./d. at 114. The nonexpert groups scored markedly
lower on the questionnaire than did the experts- near
chance levels {57% and 58% correct)./d. at 112. This
study suggests that jurors often need to be informed
about this subject in order to understand the evidence.
Other studies by Brekke and Boriga focus on the
impact RTS testimony has on jurors. These experiments
suggest that RTS testimony has a greater impact when
introduced early in trial rather than later. "Expert testimony,
when presented early in the trial, may serve as a powerful
organizing theme or basis for a juror's initial impression
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of the case. When presented later in the trial, by contrast,
the expert testimony may be treated merely as additional
information to be integrated into an existing, wellorganized impression." Brekke & Borgida, "Expert
Psychological Testimony in Rape Trials: A Social-Cognitive
Analysis," 55 J. Personality & Soc. Psycho. 372, 383
(1988). See also Borgida & Brekke, "Psycholegal
Research on Rape Trials," in Rape and Sexual Assault:
A Research Handbook 313 (A. Burgess ed. 1985}.
A second finding was that expert testimony had a
greater impact if it was "concretized" through the use of
a case-specific hypothetical question. The more general
testimony consisted of an attempt to debunk many of the
common myths about rape. The expert in the experiments testified that (a} few women falsely accuse men of
rape, (b) rape is a highly underreported crime, (c) a large
proportion of rapes involve casual acquaintance of the
victim rather than strangers, (d) rape is a crime of .
violence rather than a crime of passion, and (e) it is often
better for a woman to submit than to risk the additional
violence that could result from ineffective resistance.
When this testimony was followed by a hypothetical
question incorporating the important features of the
case, it had a greater impact. /d.
The studies also indicated that jurors did not automatically accept the expert's testimony, and that expert
testimony was important in acquaintance rape and lack
of physical resistance situations.

A.2d 741, 751 (1986); State v. Liddell, 211 Mont. 180,
186-89, 685 P.2d 918, 922-23 (1984); State v. Whitman, 16
Ohio App. 3d 246, 247, 475 N.E.2d 486, 488 (1984).
In addition, Illinois has enacted a statute that permits
the admission of evidence of post-traumatic stress
syndrome in illegal sex acts prosecutions. Ill. Ann. Stat.
ch. 38, § 115-7.2 (Smith-Hurd 1990).

limitations on Admissibility
Different courts have imposed a variety of limitations
on this use of RTS evidence. Some courts permit the
expert to testify that the victim's behavior was consistent
with RTS but not that the victim had been raped. State v.
McCoy, 179 W.Va. 223,229-30,366 S.E.2d 731, 737 (W.
Va. 1988).
Other courts prohibit:
(1) comment on the credibility of the alleged victim,
State v. Brodniak, 221 Mont. 212, 217-18, 718 P.2d 322,
326-29 (1986) (RTS evidence admissible but expert
may not comment on victim's credibility);
(2) use of the term "rape trauma syndrome," State v.
Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 109,517 A.2d 741,751 (1986)
(Avoiding the term RTS is "more than cosmetic");
(3) any reference to the accused, State v. Huang, 99
N.C. App. 658,665-66,394 S.E.2d 279,284 (1990) (RTS
evidence admissible, but expert's repeated implication
of defendant was prejudicial error), rev. denied, 327
N.C. 639, 399 S.E.2d 127 (1990).

ADMISSIBILITY: lACK OF CONSENT
Courts Rejecting Admissibility

RTS evidence may be offered at trial for several different purposes: (1} to prove lack of consent by the alleged
victim, and (2) to explain post-incident conduct by a
victim that a jury might perceive as inconsistent with the
claim of rape. The courts divide over the first use but
generally accept the second use.
·
A number of courts permit RTS evidence to be
introduced at trial to establish lack of consent, an
element of the crime of rape. The inference may be stated as a syllogism: (1} Rape victims manifest certain
characteristics kriown as RTS; (2} the alleged victim has
these symptoms; and (3} therefore she has been raped.
In 1982 in State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292
[1982), thE;! Kansas Supreme Court became.the first state
supreme court to uphold the admission of RTS evidence.
1\ psychiatrist, who examined the victim twoweeks after
:he attack, testified that the victim had suffered a "fright:ming assault" and was "suffering from the post-traumatic
>tress disorder known as rape trauma syndrome." /d. at
354, 647 P.2d at 1299. The Court concluded:
An examination of the literature clearly demonstrates that the so-called "rape trauma syndrome" is
generally accepted to be a common reaction to sexual
assault ... As such, qualified expert psychiatric
testimony regarding the existence of rape trauma
syndrome is relevant and admissible in a case such as
this where the defense is consent. /d.
Other courts followed this precedent. E.g., State v.
iuey, 145 Ariz. 59, 64, 699 P.2d 1290, 1295 (1985}; State
'· Gettier, 438 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 1989}; State v.
llcQuillen, 239 Kan. 590, 593, 721 P.2d 740, 741-42
1986}; State v. McQuillen, 236 Kan. 161, 171, 689 P.2d
122, 829 (1984); State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 109,517

Courts rejecting RTS as proof of lack of consent
dispute the scientific validity of the syndrome when
offered for this purpose. In State v. Saldana, 324 N .W. 2d
127 (1990), the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that
"(r]ape trauma syndrome is not the type of scientific test
that accurately and reliably determines whether a rape
has occurred." /d. at 229. Accord State v. McGee, 324
N.W.2d 232,233 (Minn. 1982)'.
Other courts exclude RTS evidence because it has not
been generally accepted by the scientific community as
required by the Frye test. See generally Giannelli, "The
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later," 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197 (1980).
For example, in People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681
P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984}, the California
Supreme Court noted that "rape trauma syndrome was
not devised to determine the 'truth' or 'accuracy' of a
particular past event- i.e., whether, in fact, a rape in the
legal sense occurred - but rather was developed by
professional rape counselors as a therapeutic tool, to
help identify, predict and treat emotional problems
experienced by the counselors' clients or patients." /d.
at 249-50, 681 P.2d at 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459. Thus,
according to the court, although generally accepted by
the scientific community for a therapeutic purpose,
expert testimony on RTS was not generally accepted "to
prove that a rape, in fact, occurred." /d. at 251, 681 P.2d at
301,203 Cal. Rptr. at 460. The court commented:
[A]s a rule, rape counselors do not probe inconsistencies in their clients' descriptions of the facts of the incident, nor do they conduct independent investigations
to determine whether other evidence corroborates or
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contradicts their clients' renditions. Because their
function is to help their clients deal with the trauma
they are experiencing, the historical accuracy of the
client's descriptions of the details of the traumatizing
events is not vital in their task. /d. at 250, 681 P.2d at
300, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
See also People v. Coleman, 48 Cal. 3d 112, 142-44, 768
P.2d 32, 48-49, 255 Cal. Rptr. 813, 829-30 (1990) (reaffirming Bledsoe).
Other courts accept this reasoning. E.g., Spencer v.
General Elec. Co., 688 F. Supp. 1072, 1075~77 (E.D. Va.
1988); People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 293, 552 N.E.2d
131, 138, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883, 890 (1990) (RTS "is inadmissible when itinescapably bears solely on proving that a
rape occiJrred"); State v. Hall, 330 N.C. 808,821, 412
S.E.2d 883, 890 (1992); People v. Pullins, 145 Mich. App.
414, 421-22, 378 N.W.2d 502, 505 {1985) (RTS fails Frye
test); Statev.Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235,240 (Mo. 1984);
State v. Ogle, 668 S.W.2d 138, 143-44 (Mo. App.), cert. .
denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984); Statev. Black, 109 Wash. 2d
336, 346-49, 745 P.2d 12, 15-18 (1987) (RTS fails Frye test).
ADMISSIBILITY: EXPLAINING BEHAVIOR
As noted above, the California Supreme Court rejected
RTS evidence when offered to prove lack of consent. The
court,' however, approved the admissibility of RTS
evidence where the defendant suggests to the jury that
the conduct of the victim after the incident is inconsistent
with the claim of rape. In this situation, the court wrote,
"expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome may play a
particularly useful role by disabusing the jury of some
Widely held misconceptions about rape and rape victims,
sotlia:tirntay evaluate the evidence free of popular
myths." 36 Cal. 3d at 247-48, 681 P.2d at 298, 203 Cal.
Rptr. at 457,
Most courts accept this position. For example, expert
testimony has been admitted to explain a victim's:
(1) passive resistance during a rape, Perez v. State,
653 S.W.2d 878, 882 (Tex. App. 1983) (in rebuttal,
expert explained alleged victim's passive resistance
during rape);
(2) delay in reporting the crime, United States v.
Peel, 29 M.J. 235,241 (C. M.A. 1989) (RTS evidence
admitted to explain postattack behavior-:- delay in
reporting and attempts to normalize life), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1025 {1990); People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947,
951-52(Colo.1987) (RTS evidence admissible to
explain delay in reporting); and
(3) calm demeanor after an attack, People v. Taylor,
75 N.Y.2d277, 293,552 N.E.2d 131,138,552 N.Y.S.2d
883, 890 {1990) ("[H]alf of all women who have been
forcibly raped are controlled and subdued following
the attack"); State v. Robinson, 146 Wis. 2d 315,
333-35, 431 N.W.2d 165, 172 (1988) (many victims are
"emotionally flat" immediately after assault).
RTS evidence has also been introduced to explain that
"in the context of a trust relationship, such as a doctorpatient relationship, some victims may return to the trusted relationship for further contact with the perpetrator of
the assault." Commonwealth v. Mamay, 407 Mass. 412,
421, 553 N.E.2d 945, 951 (1990).
See,a/so United States v. Hammond, 17 M.J. 218
(C. M.A. 1984) (RTS evidence admitted for sentencing

purposes); People v. Mathews, 91 Cal. App. 3d 1018,
1025, 154 Cal. Rptr. 628, 632 (1979) (RTS admitted to
support self~defense and diminished capacity claim).
ADMISSIBILITY: OFFERED BY THE DEFENSE
In Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind. 1989), the
Indiana Supreme Court held that a defendant may offer
RTS evidence to show that the victim had not been
raped. The alleged victim claimed that she had been
raped at knifepoint after leaving a bar. She returned to
the same bar the next evening for two hours and a drink.
The··defendant offered-the testimony of an expert to
comment on her posfattackconduct.
The trial court excludedthe evidence, but the Supreme
Court reversed: "Here, Dr. Gov.er's testimony would have
tended to prove that J.D.'s behavior after the incident was
inconsistent with that of a victim who had suffered a traumatic rape such as that J.O. recounted. The evidence
therefore would have a tendency to make it less probable
that a rape ill fact ()ccurred .. ."/d. at 1,191. See generally
Note, "Defense Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma
Syndrome: Implications for the Stoic Victim," 42 Hastings
L.J. 1143 (1991).
'
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE ACCOMMODATION SYNDROME
Frequently, child sexual abuse cases are difficult to
prosecute. One commentator summarized the problems
as follows:
The sexual offender is often a relative or a trusted
adult with whom the child spends time alone. Eyewitnesses to the molestation are therefore rare. In addition, sexual abuse is typically a nonviolent crime.
Children who are abused by a trusted adult usually are
manipulated psychologically and do not resist their
abusers. Physical injury cariprovide valuable medical
evidence of the sexual abuse, but this evidence often
is lacking because the abuse is committed without
force. Furthermore, the sexual abuse may involve an
act other than penetration of the vagina or anus. Crimes
such as petting, fondling or oral copulation usually do
not involve forceful physical contact and do not leave
physical scars. A lapse of time between the sexual
abuse and disclosure may also contribute to the lack of
medical evidence. Note, "The Admissibility of 'Child
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome' in California Crimillal·courts," 17 Pac. L.J. 1361, 1368-69 (1986).
Incases where there is no independent evidence of
the abuse, the credibility of the child complainant and the
defendant often becomes determinative. However, the
typical responses of child sexual abuse victims are ·
counter-intuitive in many respects. Delayed disclosure,
conflicting testimony, and retraction suggest fabrication
by the complainant unless an explanation is offered for
this anomalous behavior.
Because of these problems, prosecutors have sought
other types of evidence to substantiate sex abuse claims.
Syndrome evidence is an example. Dr. Roland Summit
coined the phrase "Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome" (CSAAS) in 1983 to describe five categories
of reactions typical of victims of child sexual abuse.
Summit "The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndro~e,'' 7 Child Abuse &Neglect 177 (1983). The first
two categories are preconditions to child sexual abuse;
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inconsistent with a claim of abuse; or (3) to bolster or
impeach the child's credibility.
In addition to these purposes, the form of the testimony may vary. For example, expert testimony offered to
establish abuse could take three different forms: (1)
general testimony about the behavioral characteristics of
abused children; (2) testimony that a particular child's
behavior is consistent with that of abused children; or (3)
an opinion that a particular child has been abused.

the last three are "sequential contingencies" that vary in
both form and degree. The categories are:
(1) Secrecy: The child receives the message, either
explicitly through threats or admonishments or implicitly,
that the subject is to be kept secret. An aura of danger
and secrecy surrounds the incidents./d. at 181.
(2) Helplessness: The imbalance of power that exists
between child and adult makes the child feel powerless
to resist. The feeling of helplessness is increased when
the abuser is a trusted friend or family member. /d. at
182-83.
(3) Entrapment and Accommodation: The child who
does not seek or receive intervention learns to live with
the sexual abuse in order to survive. In addition to
submission, other survival mechanisms include turning
to imaginary friends, developing multiple personalities,
taking refuge in altered states of consciousness or
substance abuse, running away, promiscuity, hysterical
phenomena, delinquency, sociopathy, projection of rage,
and self-mutilation. /d. at 184-86.
(4) Delayed, Conflicting and Unconvincing Disclosure:
Rarely will the child report incidents of sexual abuse
immediately upon their occurrence. Because of the time
lapse before report occurs and the emotional upheaval
experienced by the child, the disclosure is likely to
contain contradictions and misstatements. Often the
disclosure is greeted by disbelief. /d. at 186.
(5) Retraction: "Whatever a child says about sexual
abuse, she is likely to reverse it." /d. at 188. Particularly if
the abuser is a family member, the child will attempt to
undo the disintegration of the family caused by the
disclosure. /d.
Dr. Summit developed the syndrome to assist professionals in treating abused children. The syndrome is not
a diagnostic tool. "The syndrome does not detect sexual
abuse. Rather, it assumes the presence of abuse, and
explains the child's reactions to it. Thus, [CSAAS] is not
the sexual abuse analogue of battered child syndrome,
which is diagnostic of physical abuse." Myers, Bays,
Becker, Berliner, Corwin & Saywitz, "Expert Testimony in
Child S13xual Abuse Litigation," 68 Neb. L. Rev. 1, 67
(1989) [hereinafter cited as Myers]. Consequently, the
use of the term "syndrome" in court should be avoided.
Neve~heless, sexually abused children do react to the
abuse. Anxiety, depression, nightmares, enuresis,
regression, and acting out are some of the reactions.
Many of these responses, however, are associated with
other psychological problems that are unrelated to sex
abuse. In addition, apparently 20% of abused children
show no observable reactions. /d. at 64. Some reactions
are strongly suggestive of abuse: "Examples of behaviors
that have greater specificity for sexual abuse include
age-inappropriate knowledge of sexual acts or anatomy,
sexualization of play and behavior in young children, the
appearance of genitalia in young children's drawings,
and sexually explicit play with anatomically detailed
dolls." /d. at 62-63.

Characteristics of Abused Children
Some courts permit expert testimony "regarding the
behavioral and emotiqnal indicia of child sexual abuse
victims" as well as testimony that "an alleged victim
exhibits behavior consistent with such a profile." State v.
Charles L., 183 W.Va. 64i, 659,398 S.E.2d i23, i4i (W.
Va. 1990). Accord State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 609-10
(Minn. 1984).
Other courts prohibit "consistent with" testimony. For
example, the Arizona Supreme Court has ruled: "Once
the jury has learned the victim's behavior from the
evidence and has heard experts explaining why sexual
abuse may cause delayed reporting, inconsistency, or
recantation, we do not believe the jury needs an expert to
explain that the victim's behavior is consistent or inconsistent with the crime having occurred." State v. Moran,
151 Ariz. 378, 385, 728 P.2d 248,255 (1986).
Still other courts reject the substantive use of expert
testimony to prove the fact of abuse. In adopting this
position, the Utah Supreme Court questioned the scientific basis of this type of evidence.
[T]he child abuse profile consists of a long list of vague
and sometimes conflicting psychological characteristics that are relied upon to establish the fact of injury in
a specific case as well as the cause ...
Not only is there lack of any consensus about the
ability of the profile to determine abuse, but the scientific literature raises serious doubts as to the reliability
of profile testimony when used for forensic purposes to
demonstrate abuse actually occurred. State v.
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 401 (Utah 1989).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reached the same
conclusion: "According to the literature on the subject,
there is no one classical or typical personality profile for
abused children. The difficulty with identifying a set of
behaviors exhibited by abused children is that abused
children react in a myriad of ways that ... may be the
very same behaviors as children exhibit who are not
abused." Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 832
(Pa. 1992) (CASAS evidence is not generally accepted by
the scientific community).
See also Lantrip v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 816,
817 (Ky. 1986); State v. York, 564 A.2d 389, 391 (Me.
1989) (no empirical research supports reliability of diagnosing sex abuse based on subsequent behavior);
Goodson v. State, 566 So. 2d 1142, 1146-47 (Miss. 1990);
State v. Hudnall, 293 S.C. 97, 99-100, 359 S.E.2d 59,
61-62 (1987).

ADMISSIBILITY
Expert testimony on child sexual abuse may be offered
at trial for several distinct purposes: (1) as substantive
evidence to prove that the child has been abused; (2) to
explain conduct of the child that a jury might perceive as

Explaining Behavior
Virtually all courts admit evidence derived from
research on child sexual abuse when offered in response
to a defense suggestion that specific behavior is incon5

sistent with a claim of abuse. For example, courts have
admitted expert testimony to explain why a sexually
abused child:
(1) would delay making an accusation, Wheat v. State,
527 A.2d 269,273 (Del. 1987); State v. Myers, 359
N.W.2d 604, 610 (Minn. 1984); State v. Carlson, 360
N.W.2d442, 442-43 (Minn. App. 1985); Smith v.
State, 100 Nev. 570, 572-73, 688 P.2d 326, 327 (Nev.
1984);
(2) retract an accusation, State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378,
384, 728 P.2d 248, 254 (1986) (factors that lead a
victim to recant and attemptto return home are
admissible); People v. Reid, 123 Misc. 2d 1084,
1085-86; 475 N.Y.S.2d 741,741-42 (Grim. Ct. 1984);
Statev,'Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 437-38, 657 P.2d
1215, 1220-21 (1983);
(3) make inconsistent statements, Duckett v. State, 797
S.W.2d 906, 915-17 (Tex. Grim. App. 1990) (numerous inconsistencies and delayed reporting are
elements ofCSAAS);
(4) remain with the offender. Griego v. State, 761 P.2d
973, 978 fY'Jyo. 1988) (expert testified that ''it was
common for adolescent victims to remain in the
area of the offender"); or
(5) appear calm after an incident, State v. Jensen, 147
Wis. 2d 240,252, 432 N.W.2d 913, 918 (1988) (expert
testimony that it is common for sexual assault
victims to be emotionally flat admitted when
defense suggested such conduct was inconsistent
with assault claim).
Commentators have pointed out that such "expert
testimonyJsneededJo disabuse jurors of commonly held
misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain
the emotional antececlents ofabused children's seemingly self-impeaching behavior.'' Myers, supra, at 89.
Expert testimony that would explain why a mother
would refrain from reporting sex abuse of her child to the
police is also admissible. People v. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d
1289, 1302,812 P.2d 563, 283 Cal. Rptr. 382, 389 (1991).

traditional functions and roles and because, when
given insight into the behavioral sciences, the jury
needs nothing further from the expert. State v. Lindsey,
149 Ariz. 472, 475, 720 P.2d 73, 76 (1986).
Accord Lickey v. State, 108 Nev. 191, 827 P.2d 824, 826
(1992) (psychologist may not testify about veracity of a
victim); Commonwealth v. Seese, 512 Pa. 439, 444, 517
A.2d 920, 922 (1986) (pediatrician may not testify
concerning credibility of alleged 8-year old victim).
Federal Evidence Rule 608, which governs the
impeachment use of character evidence, has sometimes
played a role inJhe~case~.Rule 608(a) permits opinion
and reputation evidence concerning the truthful character of a witness after that witness has been impeached.
In State v. Kim, 64 Hawaii 598, 645 P.2dJ330 (1982), the
Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that an expeit's
testimony that he found the complaining witness "believable" was admissible under Hawaii Rule 608(a), which is
patterned after the federal rule:
While [the expert's) opinion was not couched in terms
of character, its function and effect were indistinguishable from traditional character evidence .... Essentially, the difference between an opinion as to
character for truthfulness and an opinion as to the
believability of a witness' statements is the difference
between 'I think X is believable' and 'X's statement is
believable.' We feel the admissibility of either statement
should turn not on niceties of phraseology but on the
probative value of the testimony. /d. at 610 n. 14, 645
P.2d at 1339 n. 14.
Most courts, however, reject this view. The Utah
Supreme Court concluded that the distinction rejected in
Kim "represents an important policy choice" that
prevents trials from being turned into contests between
what would amount to modern oath-helpers who would
largely usurp the fact-finding function of judge or jury."
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388,392 (Utah 1989). The
court went on to embrace the position of the majority of
courts that have "rejected Kim" and bar such testimony
under Rule 608./d. Accord United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d
336, 341 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d
595, 602 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1073 (1988).
Indeed, the 1-Jawaii Supreme Court subsequently overruled Kim. Statev. Batangan, 71 Haw. 552, 563, 799 P.2d
48, 54 (1990) (l=xpert may not that testify child is "believable" and Kim is overruled).

Credibility
. Several courts have admitted expert testimony on
credibility in this context. For example, the Montana
Supreme Court has held that expert testimony is admissible "for the purpose of helping the jury to assess the
credibility of a child sexual as.sault victim." State v.
Gayman, 224 Mont. 194, 200, 729 P.2d 475, 479 (1986).
This rule includes testimony that a particular child is tellingthe truth. See State v. Hall, 244 Mont. 161, 172-74, 797
P.2d 183, 190-91 (1990); State v. French, 233 Mont. 364,
36e. 76o P.2d 86, aa-89 (1988).
Most courts, however, prohibit this type of expert
testimony. The Arizona Supreme Court concluded:
Thus, even where expert testimony on behavioral
characteristics that affect credibility or accuracy of
observation is allowed, experts should not be allowed
to give their opinion of the accuracy, reliability or credibility of a particular witness in the case being tried ....
Opinion evidence on who is telling the truth in cases
such as this is nothing more than the expert's opinion
on how the case should be decided ... [S)uch testimony is inadmissible, both because it usurps the jury's

PROFILE OF ABUSERS
A related issue involves expert testimony that focuses
on the defendant rather than the child. Most courts
exclude evidence of an abuser profile. For example, in
United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1988),
the prosecution in rebuttal called an expert who testified ·
about the characteristics of a typical child molester.
These include "an early disruption in the family environment, often with one parent missing; a relationship with
the parent of the opposite sex who is dominant; unsuccessful relationships with women; a poor self-concept;
and general instability in the background." /d. at 480. The
Ninth Circuit ruled this testimony inadmissible. The
defendant had not offered any character evidence, and
thus rebuttal on this score was impermissible. The court
also commented that "testimony of criminal profiles is
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highly undesirable as substantive evidence because it is
of low probativity and inherently prejudicial." /d. See also
Hall v. State, 15 Ark. App. 309, 316-17, 692 S.W.2d 769,
773 (1985); Myers, supra at 144 ("The relevant scientific
literature does not support the conclusion that there is a
reliable profile of a 'typical' sex offender").
In People v. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d 1289, 1302-04, 812
P.2d 563, 569-72, 283 Cal. Rptr. 382, 389-90 (1991), the
California Supreme Court upheld the admission of expert
testimony concerning child abusers. The expert testified
that there was no profile of a typical abuser. Then he
proceeded to testify that a child molester can be from any
social or financial status, race, age, occupation,
geographic origin, or religious group. They can also be
persons of impeccable reputations. The court held this
testimony was helpful to the jury because it debunked
common myths aboutabusers: that abusers are
strangers, old, gay, alcoholic, or retarded ..
Profiles Offered by Defense
Most courts prohibit defense evidence offered to show
that the accused does not fit the sex abuser profile. For
example, the Iowa Supreme Court has ruled that a trial
judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding such
evidence on the grounds that it would not assist the jury.
State v. Hulbert, 481 N.W.2d 329,332 (Iowa 1992).
Accord United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417, 420 (8th
Cir. 1987) (sex offender profile not generally accepted in
the scientific community); State v. Tucker, 165 Ariz. 340,
346, 798 P.2d 1349, 1353-55 (App. 1990); State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633; 657,456 N.W.2d 325, 355 (1990)
(error for prosecutor to argue that the accused's history
as a victim of child sexual abuse increased likelihood
that she committed the alleged acts).
In People v. Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d 1136, 1152-53, 783P.2d
698, 707-08, 265 Cal. Rptr. 111, 120-21 (1989), the California Supreme Court adopted a minority position. The
court held that a defendant charged with child molesting
may introduce expert character evidence establishing
that he is not a deviant. See also People v. McAlpin, 53
Cal. 3d 1289, 1304, 812 P.2d 563, 576-78, 283.Cal. Rptr.
382, 391-95 (1991); People v. Ruiz, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1241.
1243, 272 Cal. Rptr. 368, 370 (1990) (scientific community
has not developed a standard pedophile profile).

the dolls were "not used as a scientific method of proof,
but merely as a tool to aid the jury with the witness'
testimony." /d. at 193. Accordingly, their use was permissible. See also Stevens v. People, 796 P.2d 946, 955 (Col.
1990) (dolls provide corroboration for admissibility of
child hearsay statements); State v. Oslund, 469 N.W.2d
489,494-95 (Minn. App. 1991).
The commentators are also divided. Many believe that
the "danger in the use of the dolls is that they will stimulate fantasy and not recall, and plant a falsified memory
of fantasy to be recalled later as truth." Christiansen,
'The Testimony of Child Witnesses: Fact, Fantasy, and
the Influence of Pretrial Interviews," 62 Wash. L. Rev.
705, 711 (1987). See also Levy, "Using 'Scientific'
Testimony to Prove Child Sexual Abuse," 23 Fam. L.Q.
148 (1989) ("[T)estimony about anatomically correct dolls
should be inadmissible"); Sagatun, "Expert Witnesses in
Child Abuse Cases," 9 Behav. Sci. & L. 201, 210-12
(Spring 1991) ("little scientific" literature on subject); J.
Myers, Child Witness Law and Practice§ 4.17L (1992
Supp.) (discussing literature on use of dolls).
In contrast, others opine that "[r)ecent research indicates that the dolls can be helpful in evaluating suspected abuse." Myers, supra at 63 n. 259.
EXAMINATION OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM
Several cases discuss a defendant's right to an
involuntary physical or psychological examination of
alleged rape or child abuse victims.

Physical Examinations
The courts have adopted several approaches to the
issue as applied to physical examinations. Comment,
"A Fourth Amendment Approach to Compulsory Physical
Examinations of Sex Offense Victims," 57 U. Chi. L. Rev.
873 (1990).
Some courts recognize a due process right to such an
examination. "In these circumstances and limited to the
facts of this case, we hold that appellant, as a matter of due
process and fairness, was entitled at least to have the
alleged victim examined by an independent gynecologist
in preparation for trial." Turner v. Commonwealth, 767
S.W.2d 557, 559 (Ky. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
Other courts allow the trial judge to order a physical
examination of an alleged child abuse victim if the defendant can demonstrate a compelling need. For example,
the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized a trial court's
inherent power to order a physical examination, but only
when there is such a need:
[C]ourts may order the physical examination of a child
sex-abuse victim only when satisfied that the defendant has made a sufficient showing that such an
examination can produce competent evidence that has
substantial probative worth, and if admitted and
believed by the trier of fact, that evidence could refute
or neutralize incriminating evidence or impugn the
credibility of prosecution witnesses. Further, the court
must be satisfied that the defendant's need clearly
outweighs the possible harmful consequences to the
alleged victim. State v. D.R.H., 127 N.J. 249, 604 A.2d
89, 95 (1992).
Accord People v. Chard, 808 P.2d 351, 353-54 (Colo. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. .186 (1991).

"ANATOMICALLY CORRECT" DOLLS
A number of courts have considered expert testimony
based on the use of "anatomically correct" dolls. In
United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1988), an
expert (child therapist) testified that "the child's behavior
with anatomically correct dolls showed she had been
abused by a man using his penis and not by a woman."
ld. at 480. The Ninth Circuit ruled that this use of the dolls
failed to satisfy the Frye general acceptance test and was
thus inadmissible. /d. at 481. Accord In re Amber B., 191
Cal. App. 3d 682, 690-91,236 Cal. Rptr. 623, 629 (1987).
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has cautioned that the
"empirical literature clearly reflects a concern that
repeated use ofthe dolls can be highly suggestive." United
States v. Spotted War Bonnet, 882 F.2d 1360, 1370 (8th
Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 110S. Ct. 3267 (1990).
Other courts disagree. In Reyna v. State, 797 S.W.2d
189 (Tex. App. 1990), a Texas appellate court ruled that
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Still other courts refuse to recognize such a right under
any conditions because the "order requiring compl~inant
to submit to a physical examination was clearly outside
the scope of discovery authorized by the statute [and
thus]the judge had no authority to issue that order and it
is void." E.g., State ex rei. Wade v. Stephens, 724 S.W.2d
141, 144-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).

Psychological Examinations
A similar diversity of opinion exists concerning involuntary psychological or psychiatric examinations. See
An not., "Necessity or Permissibility of Mental Examination
to Determine Competency or Credibility of Complainant
in Sexual Offense Prosecutions," 45 A.L.R.4th 310 (1986).
Sollie courts hold that trial courts lack the authority to
oidersuch examinations. State v. Gabrielson, 464
N.W.2d 434,436 (Iowa 1990). Others use a "substantial
need" test. Virgin Islands v. Leonard A., 922 F.2d 1141,
1143-44 (3d Cir. 1991); State v. R.W., 104 N.J. 14, 21, 514
A.2d 1287, 1291 (1986).
Defendants have challenged a refusal to order an
examination on constitutional grounds. The Ninth Circuit,
however, has ruled that a trial court's refusal to order a
psychiatric examination of two young sexual assault
victims to determine whether they exhibited signs of
Rape Trauma Syndrome did not violate due process.
Gilpin'v. McCormick, 921 F.2d 928,931 (9th Cir. 1990).
A different issue may be presented, however, if the
state uses an expert. The Nevada Supreme Court has
held: "[U)nless competent evidence presents a compelling reason to protect the victim, it is error to deny a
defendant the assistance of a defense psychologist or
J:ISychia:trist to examine the child-victim and testify at trial
Hie-State is provided such assistance." Lickey V.
State, 827 P.2d 824, 826 (Nev. 1992).
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